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Is the book by North, Wallis and Weingast 
about economy or about history? This questi-
on is not difﬁ  cult to answer. Every economist 
educated in Europe knows that the greatest 
economists were also good historians. They 
simply understood that people are famili-
ar with recorded human history, so that the 
explanation of economic theories using his-
torical examples had the biggest chance to be 
understood. Moreover, the greatest economists 
also knew that the interpretation of recorded 
human history is crucial for understanding of 
social phenomena and the misinterpretation of 
historical facts might have disastrous impact 
on the evolution of every society. North, Wallis 
and Weingast are certainly aware of these 
facts. As such they can be rightly considered 
as great economists.
Studying the human recorded history is 
always a challenging adventure. Explaining 
new theoretical concepts using historical 
examples is even more challenging. North, 
Wallis and Weingast try to provide an unders-
tanding of the nature of pressing problems 
like poverty and economic development with 
the use of an impressive method. They do not 
only stress the collection and interpretation of 
historical facts. Instead of formal logic, they 
simply use historical examples to explain 
their theoretical model. As they conclude: 
“We are not writing a history of the world. 
The history provides examples and illumina-
tions rather than conclusive test of our idea” 
(p. xii). In my opinion the book Violence and 
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for 
Interpreting Recorded Human History, is thus 
more theoretical than empirical even though 
it contains facts from history. North, Wallis 
and Weingast realize that pressing problems 
like poverty and economic development need 
to be understood with the help of an accessi-
ble conceptual framework.
“The central task of this book is to arti-
culate the underlying logic of the two new 
patterns of social organization, which the 
authors call social orders, and to explain how 
societies make the transition from one social 
order to the other” (p. 1). In the introduction, 
following the traditions of the new institutio-
nal economics, the authors provide evidence 
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suggesting that human organization determi-
nes the pattern of incentives inducing entre-
preneurial activities and promoting economic 
development. Solution of pressing problems 
of poverty and economic development thus 
lays in the organizational arrangement of 
societies. But why are some societies bet-
ter organized than others? North, Wallis and 
Weingast argue that it is because successful 
societies control violence. The problem is not 
how to organize a society to be economical-
ly successful but how to control violence in 
order to enforce successful economic orga-
nization. The book therefore concentrates on 
explaining the ways to control violence in 
two kinds of social orders – the natural state 
and the open access order.
In the ﬁ  rst chapter, the authors short-
ly explain the conceptual framework of the 
natural state and the open access order. While 
the natural state is a hierarchical organizati-
on based on patron-client relationships, the 
open access order is based on impersonal and 
reciprocal partnerships. In the natural state, 
elites control coercive power throughout the 
social recognition and overall acceptance 
supported by religion and ideology. The elites 
control also trade. In the natural state, there 
is a market. However, it is crippled due to 
limited access. One of the striking examples 
limiting access is a privilege (charter) to form 
subordinated market organizations. Contrary 
to the natural state, the open access order is 
an organization with open access to economic 
activities and with limited coercive power. In 
the open access order, coercive power is used 
without manipulation of elites. As North, 
Wallis and Weingast emphasize: “The origins 
of legal system lies in the deﬁ  nition of elite 
privileges” (p. 49). Naturally, the open access 
order is more economically successful than 
the natural state.
The second chapter is dedicated to the 
explanation of the natural state. “The natu-
ral state is natural, because, for the most of 
the last ten thousand years, it has been vir-
tually the only form of society larger than 
a few hundred people that has been capable 
of securing physical order and managing 
violence” (p. 49). “All natural states limit 
access to organizational forms. All natural 
states control trade (p. 38).” And, as was said 
above, in the natural states, the legal system 
is subordinated to the elites. To illuminate 
the meaning of the natural state the second 
chapter presents two historical examples. The 
ﬁ  rst is the example of the Aztec Empire and 
the second is the example of the Carolingian 
Empire. The Aztec Empire was ruled by the 
coalition of three ethnic groups living in the 
three city-states. The leaders were organized 
in the Council of Four. The Aztec Empire 
was interesting for its speciﬁ  c religion, which 
helped the ruling elites to maintain order 
via ideology of hierarchical structure, and 
for its educational system, which was trai-
ning warrior skills, values, reading and also 
arts. As all natural states the Aztec Empire 
was also controlling trade. Both, the local 
agricultural production and privileged long-
distance trade with luxury goods were under 
control of regulating and taxing by the state. 
Contrary to the Aztec empire, the Carolingian 
Empire was culturally different, neverthe-
less, it is characterized by similar organiza-
tional structure. After collapse of the Roman 
Empire in Europe the Catholic Church retai-
ned its inﬂ  uence. Later, in the year 800 when 
the Charlemagne was recognized as emperor, 
the pope broke political relationships with 
the Eastern emperor and became a part of the 
Carolingian Empire. The Carolingian Empire 
was ruled by the military occupying vassals. 
The long-distance trade was controlled by 
the privileged coalition of traders protected 
by the emperor. In alliance with the clergy 
Carolingians were regulating and taxing trade 
between monasteries and a few trade centers. 
The church was responsible for education, 
social welfare and the system of courts enfor-
cing law through religion. Inner dynamics of 
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broke up is interestingly described further in 
the second chapter.
The third chapter applies to the natu-
ral state. In the natural state, the key require-
ment for extracting rents is the deﬁ  nition of 
property rights to the land. North, Wallis and 
Weingast describe how the land law evolved 
in England. They describe how the law was 
changed and how the court system enforcing 
property rights was structured. With the rise 
of “bastard feudalism” in England, the milita-
ry enforcing the landlords’ privileges created 
the atmosphere of violence.
The fourth chapter explains the open 
access order, which is less violent than the 
natural order. The open access order is speci-
ﬁ  c with its ideology of freedom and equality. 
The open access order is ruled with the help 
of military and police, but these are governed 
via transparent rules. A typical open access 
order is market democracy, in which the citi-
zens share same believes and rights ensuring 
the access to public goods such as enforce-
ment of contracts. The citizens also have open 
access to political power through elections 
or they can control political power with the 
help of free media. An interesting characte-
ristic of the open access order is a large state. 
The large state, however, does not privilege 
elites because: “it is harder for these states 
to force potential opponents to support the 
state by threatening to cut off important ser-
vices if they fail to do so” (p. 113). The state 
has a monopoly on violence. In summary, 
the open access order is characterized by: “1. 
A widely held set of believes about the inclu-
sion of and equality for all citizens. 2. Entry 
into economic, political, religious, and educa-
tional activities without restraint. 3. Support 
for organizational forms in each activity that 
is open to all (for example, contract enforce-
ment). 4. Rule of law enforced impartially for 
all citizens. 5. Impersonal exchange” (p. 114).
Further in the chapter, North, Wallis 
and Weingast discuss issues connected with 
the description of the open access state. 
Especially interesting is their discussion of 
the role of the state in countries like Austria, 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands or the 
Scandinavian countries. The combination of 
a welfare state and market economy is quali-
ﬁ  ed by international market competition and 
impersonal application of rules constraining 
violence (p. 121). This might be an inspira-
tion for the Czech Republic. Another intere-
sting discussion stresses the importance of 
competition; not only market competition or 
political competition, but also competition in 
violence. The authors argue that when mar-
ket competition ensures economic success 
and when political competition prevents rent 
creation, the open access order is more com-
petitive in war. 
The ﬁ  fth chapter is dedicated to the tran-
sition from the limited access order, the natu-
ral state, to the open access order. The ques-
tion of transition is as follows: Why should 
the ruling elites extracting rents transform the 
limited access order into an open access order 
and lose thus their rents? Understandably, 
transition without the support of elites is 
impossible. North, Wallis and Weingast argue 
that even the elites face competition and in 
some historical and economical circumstan-
ces they must deal with inner conﬂ  icts and 
ruling agenda through impersonal relation-
ships. Transition from personal to impersonal 
relationships in the ruling class is the ﬁ  rst step 
inciting the transition from the limited access 
order to the open access order. 
Further in the chapter, North, Wallis and 
Weingast argue that the transition itself must 
fulﬁ   ll three doorstep conditions to be suc-
cessful. “DC#1. Rule of law for elites. DC#2. 
Perpetually lived organizations in the public 
and private spheres. DC#3. Consolidated 
control of the military“ (p. 151). The rule of 
law means that the elites, even though the 
law does not threaten them as ordinary citi-
zens, have open access to political power. 
This means that political power is distributed 
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that are applied to every member of the ruling 
class equally and without manipulation. This, 
however, does not mean that the rule of law 
is completely established. The rules regulat-
ing impersonal relationships among members 
of the ruling class must be enforced via an 
independent court system, which is also able 
to protect citizens against the government. 
Both, ordinary citizens and members of the 
ruling class must have the same access to the 
enforcement of the law even though the law 
treats them differently. Interestingly, this does 
not mean that rules enforced by independent 
court system must be fair; only the access to 
the enforcement of the law must be opened. 
Doorstep condition #2, perpetually lived 
organizations in the public and private sphere, 
extends doorstep condition #1. To establish 
impersonal relationships between members 
of the ruling class and ordinary citizens, it is 
necessary to separate the organizational agen-
da from the ruler or the governor. Perpetually 
lived organizations are those, which are inde-
pendent from the person of ruler or governor 
and fulﬁ  ll their tasks even after the death of 
their architects. North, Wallis and Weingast 
explain and describe the separation of rulers 
and governors from perpetually lived orga-
nizations with the help of several historical 
examples. In my opinion, perpetually lived 
organizations are somewhat like impersonal 
bureaucracies in the sense of corporation. The 
doorstep condition #3, consolidated control 
of the military, is interesting. The question of 
the third doorstep condition is, however, how 
to transform the military from “exploiting the 
master to protecting the servant.” “The big 
question is whether to kill the goose that lays 
golden eggs and eat the goose today, or pam-
per the goose and enjoy a ﬂ  ow of gold in the 
future” (p. 174). North, Wallis and Weingast 
argue that this question is solved by the rul-
ing elites. When the ruling elites recognize 
that the revenues from trade are able to pro-
vide the military with more wealth than the 
exploitation of citizens’ property, the third 
doorstep condition is fulﬁ  lled. At that point 
the military must fall into the shade and con-
form to the control of citizens or independent 
ruling elites approving its activities and its 
purchases of the war equipment. This mini-
mizes the risk that the military will be used 
against citizens. Without this rational deci-
sion considering the impact of use of military 
on the future economic development of the 
social organization the control of the mili-
tary is impossible. Again, North, Wallis and 
Weingast explain and describe the transition 
of the military using very impressive histori-
cal examples.
In the sixth chapter the authors pre-
sent again a range of very interesting histo-
rical examples. In this chapter the authors 
also demonstrate their deep insight into the 
history of Western civilization and general 
social science including social philosophy. In 
my opinion, the most interesting part is the 
presentation of democracy as an example of 
an evolving social experiment. The authors 
patiently demonstrate the forgotten truth that 
democracy is the type of organization that 
must be learned. Only brave and ideological-
ly self-conscious elites were able to transform 
privileges into political rights and thus open 
the possibility to explore new and historical-
ly successful organizations. In this spirit, the 
authors suggest that democracy is not the end 
of the transition and therefore barriers to entry 
must be eliminated again. Even though we 
cannot know what will happen in the future, 
we must give the society a chance. The sixth 
chapter provides evidence that the authors 
might be considered to be the followers of 
Friedrich August von Hayek (i.e. 1991) and 
as the proponents of the discovery process 
and the process of creative destruction. They 
simply apply it to the endogenous evolution 
of political institutions.
In the seventh chapter the authors 
conclude their book clearly inspired by 
Schumpeter: 
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of institutions and organizations that encou-
rage experimentation, reward successful 
innovation, and, equally important, eliminate 
failures. There is clearly no guarantee that 
humans will ﬁ   nd solutions to the new and 
novel problems that we will confront in the 
future, but some sets of social institutions [the 
open access order] and organizations make it 
more likely we will do so.
Creative destruction in both the econo-
mic and political realm appears to be neces-
sary requirement for adaptive efﬁ  ciency. 
Schumpeter’s failure to imagine creative 
political destruction led him to conclude that 
capitalism was ultimately doomed to failure. 
Perhaps he will ultimately be proved right: 
open access social orders may turn out not to 
be sustainable in the same way that natural 
state have been sustainable for ten thousand 
years. Nonetheless, the durability of the open 
access order society in the face of ubiquitous 
efforts to create rents is testimony to the cru-
cial role of adaptive efﬁ  ciency.” (p. 253)
These words summarize the contribu-
tion of the North’s, Wallis’ and Weingast’s 
book. In my opinion, the central message of 
the book is the following. Open access order 
must be protected, because on the one hand 
it is successful in adaptation to the pressing 
problems of poverty and economic develop-
ment and on the other hand it is vulnerable to 
transform into the limited access order. Open 
access order is not an exogenous social order; 
open access order is evolving and its adap-
tability makes it the most stable and durable 
kind of social order in the world. These are 
the reasons why we should extend what 
we have learned so far, and why we should 
suppress the violence. Social scientist thus 
should not answer the question how to create 
the open access order, but they should answer 
the question how to suppress violence.
What could be added? North’s and 
Wallis’ and Weingasts’ book is well written, 
well structured and presents new explana-
tions of some historical myths. Moreover, 
the book contains many sometimes old and 
conservative but patiently clariﬁ  ed  impres-
sive insights. I heartily recommend this 
book to every proponent of new institutional 
economics, Austrian economics and more 
importantly to every economist concerned 
with economics of transition. Violence and 
Social Order contains important suggestions 
for public policy for countries in transition. 
However, Kohn (2009) criticizes the authors 
for laying too much stress on the Hobbesian 
nature of human behaviour. According to 
Kohn, the book treats the man more as a vio-
lent creature than a cooperative social being. 
This criticism thus demonstrates the character 
of the whole book, which according to Kohn 
lacks the detailed explanation of endogenous 
evolution of market institutions.